Process Algebra Contexts and
Security Properties
Fundamenta Informaticae, Vol. 102, No. 1 (2010), pp 63-76
ABSTRACT: A general framework for defining security properties is presented.
It allows us to model many traditional security properties as well
as to define new ones. The framework is based on process algebras
contexts and processes relations. By appropriate choice of both of
them we can model also probabilistic and quantified security
properties. (pdf)
A notion of biological diagnosability inspired by the notion of
opacity in systems security
Fundamenta Informaticae, Vol. 102, No. 1 (2010), pp 19-34
ABSTRACT:
A formal model for diagnostics of biological systems modelled as P systems is
presented. We assume the presence of some biologically motivated
changes (frequently pathological) in the systems behavior and investigate when
these changes could be diagnosed by an external observer by exploiting
some techniques originally developed for reasoning on system security.
(pdf)
Quantifying Security for Timed Process Algebras
Fundamenta Informaticae, Vol. 93, No. 1-3 (2009),
pp 155-169
ABSTRACT:
A quantification of process's security by quantification of an
amount of information flow is defined and studied in the framework
of timed process algebras. The resulting quantified security is
compared with other (qualitative) security notions. Unprecise and
limited observations are defined and discussed.
(pdf)
Security in a Model for Long--running Transactions
Fundamenta Informaticae.
Vol. 85, No. 1-4 (2008), pp 189-203, 2008
ABSTRACT:
Communicating Hierarchical Transaction-based Timed Automata have been
introduced to model systems performing long--running transactions.
Here, for these automata a security concept is introduced, which is based on a notion of opacity and on the assumption that an attacker can not only observe public system activities, but also cause abortion of some of them. Different intruder capabilities as well as different kinds of opacity are defined and the resulting security properties are investigated. Security of long--running transactions is defined by the mentioned notion of opacity and conditions for compositionality are established.
(pdf)
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae.
Vol. 85, No. 1-4 (2008), pp 173-187, 2008
ABSTRACT:
A formal model for description of probabilistic timing attacks is
presented and studied. It is based on a probabilistic timed process
algebra, on observations (mappings which make visible only a part of
system behavior) and on an information flow. The resulting security
properties are studied and compared with other security concepts.
(pdf)
Observation Based System Security
Fundamenta Informaticae, 79 (2007), Numbers 3-4, pp. 335-346, 2007
ABSTRACT:
A formal model for description of passive and active timing attacks
is presented, studied and compared with other security concepts. It
is based on a timed process algebra and on a concept of observations
which make only a part of system behaviour visible. From this
partial information which contains also timing of actions an
intruder tries to deduce some private system activities.
(pdf)
Information-Flow Attacks Based on Limited Observations
Proc. of PSI'06, Springer Verlag, LNCS 4378, Berlin, pp
219-230, 2007
ABSTRACT:
Two formal models for description of timing attacks are presented,
studied and compared with other security concepts. The models are
based on a timed process algebra and on a concept of observations
which make visible only a part of a system behaviour.
An intruder tries to deduce some private system activities
from this partial information which contains also timing of actions.
To obtain realistic security characterizations some limitations
on observational power of the intruder are applied.
It is
assumed that the intruder has only limited time window to perform
the attack or time of action occurrences can be measured only with a
given limited precision.
(pdf)
Network Information Flow
Fundamenta Informaticae,
Volume 72, Numbers 1-3, pp 167-180, 2006
ABSTRACT:
A formal model for an analysis of an information flow in
interconnection networks is presented. It is based on timed process
algebra which can express also network properties. The information
flow is based on a concept of deducibility on composition.
Robustness of systems against network timing attacks is defined. A
variety of different security properties which reflect different
security requirements are defined and investigated.
(pdf)
Process Algebras for Network Communication
Fundamenta Informaticae, 45(4), pp 359-378, 2001
ABSTRACT:
Critical issues that arise when process algebras are used
for protocol specifications are discussed. To overcome some
of these problems, a process algebra for protocol
specifications is presented. It is based on Milner's
Calculus of Communicating Systems, which is enriched by time
and network reasoning. Several bisimulation based semantics
for the calculus are defined and their properties are discussed.
(pdf)